Rightly defending their player,the Eagles have argued that the Kelly deal can only be judged in future years,once the various youngsters who were drafted with later choices - including Luke Edwards - have played for some time.
Fair enough. In five years,we’ll know the result,and bear in mind some trades and picks from 2001 are still the subject of debate. We can only judge the deal in 2022 on the output of the player and the impact on his team - and on the opportunity cost of handing over those picks and the best part of $5 million.
All judgements on players are largely subjective. Mine is that Kelly is not an elite midfielder. He’s the third or fourth midfielder in a powerful side,a supporting actor rather than the lead.
All judgements on players are largely subjective. Mine is that Kelly is not an elite midfielder. He’s a good,classy-looking mid,but not on the same level as Luke Shuey or Elliott Yeo at their zeniths. He’s the third or fourth midfielder in a powerful side,a supporting actor rather than the lead.
His numbers this year are modest:averaging 21.5 disposals,4.5 clearances,8.8 contested possessions. The major disappointment has been ball use,since he’s ranked as below average for disposal efficiency and effective kicks.
Tim Kelly is not quite the player West Coast hoped for,and they’re certainly not the team he joined.Credit:Gety Images
The price the Eagles paid wouldn’t matter much if Kelly was the difference between finishing fifth and a grand final or flag. That’s the scenario that led to the Kelly trade.
They’d won a flag 12 months earlier before finishing a close fifth in 2019 (having critically blown the double chance v Hawthorn in round 22). Kelly was seen as the player who could make those few inches of difference and,at 25,was still young enough to justify the cost.
Whatever one’s assessment of Kelly’s worth,West Coast’s present struggles and trajectory - and the underlying paucity of emerging elite talent (the team smashed by Richmond did not have a single player younger than 21) - means the trade has been poorly timed.
Historically,the Eagles have been loath to give up too much for imported players and have relied largely on the draft. They’ve usually assessed themselves accurately and made decisions accordingly.
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They were willing to go down in 2008,after Chris Judd went home and those “cultural issues” saw others such as Ben Cousins,Daniel Chick and Daniel Kerr depart and/or decline,and then drafted Nic Naitanui and Shuey,followed by Andrew Gaff and Jack Darling (2010).
In the Kelly deal,they’ve misjudged on two counts. First,they believed themselves in contention for another season or two when they were heading south. Second,they’ve judged that Kelly would make a material difference to performance.
Views on the Kelly trade vary. One experienced list manager from another club defended the deal because West Coast was entitled to take the punt on another flag in 2019 and had been derailed somewhat by COVID-19 during 2020. “It’s much easier to judge in hindsight. They were giving themselves one more roll of the dice.”
The list manager added,“they haven’t given up top 10 picks.” That’s in contrast to Collingwood’s more costly acquisition of Adam Treloar and Essendon’s Dylan Shiel deal (Shiel swapped for a pick nine that was bid up to pick 11,plus pick 14 the next year). The former was offloaded cheaply in 2020,the latter dropped by Essendon this weekend.
What was most jarring about the Kelly trade was the sense that the Eagles were acting contrary to their own proven methods. That’s not Kelly’s fault.
He’s not quite the player they hoped for,and they’re certainly not the team he joined.