As Queensland premier,Mike Ahern was determined to tie his government to Fitzgerald’s recommendations.Credit:Mike Larder
Yet Ahern preemptively – and quite deliberately,as he later told Masters in aFour Corners interview – tied his government to Fitzgerald’s recommendations “lock,stock and barrel”.
Ahern’s sincerity towards the accountability agenda was evident in late 1988 when he established the long called-forPublic Accounts Committee to scrutinise government expenditure.
Despite such commitments,the repercussions for the National Party from the inquiry’s findings,delivered in Fitzgerald’s report on July 3,1989,were politically grave and probably unavoidable.
Shortly afterwards,and barely two months out from an election,the rattled Nationals jettisoned Ahern for Russell Cooper as leader. But they could not stem the popular tide turning against a government seen aslacking legitimate authority.
After Wayne Goss was elected premier in December 1989,his government was quick to begin the electoral reform and public administration overhaul that marked its first term in office.
Goss’ win signalled “the end of the Bjelke-Petersen era”,as he put it on election night. He might have added,the “beginning of the Fitzgerald era”.
Labor leader Wayne Goss claims victory in the 1989 Queensland state election.Credit:Queensland ALP
An Electoral and Administrative Review Commission (EARC) and Criminal Justice Commission (CJC),major recommendations of the inquiry report,had beenlegislated or instigated under Ahern and then Cooper. In both cases,their implementation,staffing and resourcing were rounded out and given momentum by Goss.
Notably,Goss had a “fractious” relationship with the CJC’s inaugural commissioner,Sir Max Bingham,andrevealed in interview prior to his premature death his personal misgivings about the Commission’s operations while he was premier.
Several other “Fitzgerald reforms” and initiatives were promptly implemented by Goss’ administration,including freedom of information (FOI) provisions,MPs’ pecuniary interest registers,and the right to peaceful public assembly. It also dismantled the state’s system of electoral malapportionment (the long-derided “gerrymander”).
The Electoral Act 1992 established an electoral redistribution based largely on the principle of “one vote,one value”,applying for the first time at the September 1992 state election – at which Goss was duly returned.
Yet even under Goss’ leadership,the full extent of reforms mapped out in Fitzgerald’s report were notwholly realised.
Changes to Queensland’s accountability systems since the Fitzgerald Inquiry have been significant,if not committed to consistently byensuing administrations.
Critics point to periodic regressions orexecutive reluctance to maintain the reform process. Insufficient whistleblower protections and impediments to FOI access,among other transparency failings under governments on both sides of politics,have at timesdulled the shine on the post-Fitzgerald integrity framework.
Fitzgerald himself has seen fit on occasion to highlight Queensland politicians’ departures from a commitment to reform and accountability.
Campbell Newman found this to his cost when sustained criticism of his “undermining” of thejudiciary’s independence,or harking back to Joh-era electoralpork-barrelling,eroded his hold on executive authority.
Equally,the current Palaszczuk government’s changes to Queensland’s voting laws,opportunistically reverting to full preferential voting,were decried as beingagainst the intent of Fitzgerald reforms.
An often-cited illustration of improved accountability is the example of Gordon Nuttall,the former Beattie government minister sacked then convicted in 2009 and 2010 on charges ofcorruption and perjury. He was sentenced to a total of 12 years in prison.
As Queensland political scientist Rae Wear eloquentlyput it:
…denial[of corruption] of the kind practised by Bjelke-Petersen and Russ Hinze was no longer a viable option. Nor was the acceptance of cash in brown paper bags.
The CJC and its successor,the Crime and Misconduct Commission (now the Crime and Corruption Commission) – as well as New South Wales’ ICAC,established in 1988 – are held up as models forcorruption watchdog agencies,potentially including a future federal ICAC.
The inquiry’s report has become something of an article of faith within Queensland’s civic life. Noted Queensland historian Raymond Evansdescribed it as the product of “the most remarkable Commission of Inquiry in Australia’s history”.
Indeed,elected members (including the current Labor Premier) have been known to brandish the report in parliament,manifesto-like,to cast aspersions of impropriety at theiropposite numbers. This reflects the extent to which the Fitzgerald Inquiry became a millstone around the necks of conservative Queensland politicians at its inception over 30 years ago.
The taint of official corruption exposed by the inquiry,and the public’s faith in accountability reforms embodied in Fitzgerald’s report,can partly explain why the Nationals and Liberals (now LNP) have struggled to regain and hold office over the past three decades in Queensland.
But the accountability agenda is one that leaders on both sides of Queensland politicshave pursued before and should commit to upholding still.
Chris Salisbury,Research Associate,School of Political Science&International Studies,The University of Queensland
This article is republished fromThe Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read theoriginal article.