Apartment buildings at China Evergrande Group’s Life in Venice real estate and tourism development in Qidong,Jiangsu province.Credit:Bloomberg
But it never got off the wave of credit that led it to shore. When Chinese regulators and banks decided it was unsustainable last year to keep the endless ride going Evergrande turned to some of its 200,0000 employees. It promised them returns of up to 25 per cent annual interest on a two-year loan if they re-invested in the company.
Evergrande’s model worked as long as it could keep building and selling at an inexorable rate. It would borrow to buy land,get homeowners to buy off the plans,and then borrow again to start another project.
Behind the theme parks and flashy boulevards,the interest bill was mounting. By last July its liabilities had reached 86 per cent of all of its assets. As banks and regulators shunned the group it turned increasingly to short-term solutions with crippling interest rates.
Evergrande’s slow demise has exposed deep flaws in China’s growth model.Credit:Bloomberg
“What set Evergrande apart was its heavy reliance on short-term debt,making it especially vulnerable to tighter credit conditions,” said senior Capital Economics China economist Julian Evans-Pritchard.
China’s high-profile corporate crackdown of the past six months has been characterised by the targeting of tech giants such as Alibaba,but the tighter regulatory environment for property developers began in earnest last year when the Chinese government introduced its “three red lines” policy,making it harder for the likes of Evergrande to keep borrowing to service its debts.